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ABSTRACT 
 
The study uses a cross-sectional data set for 209 countries in order to examine the 
relationship between gender inequality and its determinants, such as the economic 
development, information communication technology (ICT), education, and 
institutions in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. We test whether the 
regulation of social life by Islamic norms and values is related to gender inequality 
and whether the impacts differ for the MENA countries, as well as Arab and Muslim 
majority countries. The study finds that the impact of gender inequality differs for the 
MENA, Arab and Muslim majority countries only when control variables are 
excluded from the regressions. The apparently significant religious and oil impacts 
disappear once control variables, such as the institutional quality, education, and ICT, 
are incorporated into the regressions. The paper obtains empirical evidence against 
belief that the religion and oil are culprits responsible for holding women back in the 
MENA, Arab, and Muslim majority countries. Neither of these factors fully explains 
the facts.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Gender inequality and disparities between males and females have serious cost 
implications, and negatively affect human and economic development by creating 
more poverty, less economic growth with bad governance, and lower level living 
standards for their citizens (World Bank, 2003). However, it is commonly expected 
that the development of information and communication technologies (ICT) will 
improve human and economic development through its direct and indirect impacts on 
reducing gender inequality.  
 
Our main focus in this study is on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. 
We also consider Arab countries as a subgroup, and Muslim countries in a broader 
sense in the analysis. According to the World Bank reports for MENA (2004, 2012), 
there is a paradoxical situation in this region in terms of gender equality and 
development.  Most countries in this region have increased women‘s education and 
health level through investments in social sectors. However, it does not reflect in the 
female labor force participation rate, and has not grown as much as expected. The 
World Bank estimates these countries need 150 or more years before they will catch 
up to the current world average (World Bank, 2012, p.3).  Abdelali-Martini (2011) 
mentions that staying at home, instead of working, is seen as a symbol of prestige for 
women in MENA region, which may explain these trends.  
 
Labor force participation is however is only one dimension of gender inequality 
relating to employment. Most studies (see for instance Rauch and Kostyshak, 2009; 
Moghadam, 2004; Ross, 2008; World Bank, 2012) used labor force participation to 
draw inference on the extent of gender inequality in the MENA and Muslim countries 
in general.  However, gender inequality is a much broader concept involving labor 
market, empowerment, and reproductive health. Gender inequality in the Muslim 
countries, when viewed in a broader sense than simply labor force participation, needs 
a broader consideration with its many dimension. This study takes a broader view and 
considers several dimensions in the analysis.    
 
Research on gender equality for the MENA region became more popular in the 
aftermath of the Arab Spring.  However, studies analyzing gender equality in the 
73 
 
MENA region from the Islamic orientation point of view argue that Muslim countries 
still have some cultural and political drawbacks affecting equality within society 
(Fish, 2002; Inglehart and Norris, 2003).  Therefore, Brotman et al. (2008) suggests 
understanding the role of political Islam (Law of Islam) in the MENA region before 
understanding the policy or traditional culture in this region.  
 
However, gender inequality in a country may not be directly attributed to Islam. 
When we consider to what extent Muslim countries apply religious laws, there is 
diversity in the region. Therefore, some argue that the Muslim ratio (the ratio of 
Muslims to non-Muslims) should not be taken as an explanatory variable or direct 
measure of gender inequality in MENA.  
 
Therefore, we maintain the first comparison for the MENA region, and then we 
compare them as Arab and non-Arab, Islamic and non-Islamic, oil exporting and non-
oil exporting, and we include their interaction as well.  
 
The study uses a cross-section data set for 209 countries from the year 2008 to 
investigate (1) the impact of the Muslim ratio, Islam, and oil on gender equality, 
especially for MENA region, while controlling for (2) the impact per capita income as 
a proxy for the level of economic development (3) the impact of ICT on gender 
equality, and (4) the impact of institutional and social infrastructure.  
 
The econometric estimation uses gender inequality index (GII) as a measure of gender 
equality. GII is developed by the United Nations and based on three dimensions of 
gender inequality; the labor market, empowerment and reproductive health with five 
indicators: a labour force participation indicator relating to the labour market 
dimension; secondary level and above educational attainment, and parliamentary 
representation indicators relating to the empowerment dimension; adolescent fertility
1
 
and maternal mortality
2
 indicators relating to the reproductive health dimension. GII 
ranges from 0 (no inequality) to 1 (complete inequality).  
                                                        
1
 It is defined as ―number of births to women ages 15-19‖ (UNDP, 2010, p.232) 
2
 According to UNDP(2010), maternal death is defined as ―the death of women while pregnant or 
within 42 days after terminating a pregnancy due to any cause related do or by pregnancy not due to 
accidental or incidental causes‖ (p. 233). 
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The study uses the ICT index as an explanatory variable which is based on the 
number of computers per 100 persons, the number of internet users per 100 persons, 
the number of telephones per 100 persons, ICT expenditure as a share of GDP, ICT 
expenditure per capita, and mobile subscribers per employee. It is commonly 
expected that ICT should have impact on socioeconomic development and improving 
gender equality, especially for developing countries, through different pathways such 
as increasing productivity (Javala and Pohjola, 2002; Sitiroh, 2002;) and creating new 
job opportunities (European Commission, 2004; OECD, 2010). This optimistic view 
is supported by Gajjala and Mamidipudi (1999), Lagesen (2008), and Wajcman 
(2009), among others. On the other hand, the pessimistic view emphasizes that ICT 
increases gender inequality due to socioeconomic inequality (Arun et al., 2004; 
Gigler, 2004; Koutsouris, 2010). This view is based on the argument that some factors 
will limit women‘s access to ICTs in most countries, especially in rural areas, and this 
will increase the gender divide and affect women‘s empowerment process.  
 
Another variable used in this study is institutional quality index that includes Political 
Risk Service (PRS) Group‘s six indicators, which are i) Bureaucratic quality, which 
shows the quality and strength of bureaucracy as shock absorber, ii) Composite risk 
rating, which shows political, economic and financial risk rates of the countries iii) 
Corruption, which is the failure of governance in the economic, financial, and 
political environment, iv) Democratic accountability, which shows the responsiveness 
of the government to its citizens, as well as free and fair elections of the government, 
v) Government Stability, which shows the ability of the government to stay in office 
and manage its programs vi) Law and order, which shows the strength of the legal 
system and practice of complying with laws. Since all six measures are highly 
correlated we construct an index of institutional quality from the underlying six series 
using principal components analysis.  
 
Our study, thus, contributes in four ways to the existing studies. First, we used the 
gender inequality index to cover more than one dimension of gender equality. 
Previous studies used labor force activity rates of female and average years of 
schooling for female separately as a measure of gender inequality in employment and 
education, respectively. Second, The paper then uses the ICT index and institutional 
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index as explanatory variables, which are broadly considered in the literature from 
both pessimistic and optimistic point of views. Third, we test the impact of religion 
and oil on gender equality in MENA countries and Arab countries. Fourth, the paper 
avoids simple using a dummy variable in order to estimate the impact of Islamic 
religiosity. Dummy variables are poor substitutes for more analytical models and 
incorrect inferences may arise when the binary classification is not suitable. In order 
to measure the religion impact on gender equality, we used two different regressions 
in terms of the religion related explanatory variables, which are the Muslim ratio and 
social regulation of religion index (range between 0-10, lower is less regulation).  In 
each regression, variables such as purchasing power parity (PPP), adjusted per capita 
income, average years of schooling, and dummies for MENA, oil exporters, Arabs, 
and Islam are used as control variables. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces underlying 
economic theory. Section 3 explains the empirical model and estimation 
methodology. In Section 4, we present the data and empirical results. Finally, Section 
5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. ECONOMIC THEORY ON GENDER EQULITY, ICT AND 
INSTITUTIONAL-SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
The objective of this study is to examine the relationship between gender gap, 
information communication technology (ICT), and institutional and social 
infrastructure (religion particularly), in the MENA region and other Muslim countries 
as well.  
Firstly, we briefly explain several main concepts used in this study before empirical 
analysis. Women are faced in life with ―unequal human capabilities‖ (Nussbaum, 
2002, p. 46). Amartya Sen, winner of the 1998 Nobel Prize in economics, gives the 
main theoretical framework on gender discrimination by developing a ―capability 
approach.‖  According to Sen‘s approach, focusing on what women are able to be or 
are able to do is much more important than focusing on what she can consume or the 
income she receives. (Sen, 2001, 2005) However, the neoclassical economic theory 
explains the problem as a part of lower level economic growth and development. 
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According the neoclassical theory, when growth of a country increases, it will create 
new employment opportunities for women. However, the neoclassical approach 
ignores dynamics and outcomes within the family, and the intra-family distribution of 
income, while taking income as the overall welfare of persons and utility as people‘s 
psychological happiness or satisfaction (Hicks, 2002; Sen, 2005).  The social 
structure, including the family, is a main cause of the inequalities. Gender inequality 
leads to decreased access of women to markets and educational and health services, 
then, in turn, it reduces the well-being of the children and the country‘s economic 
growth (WB Global Monitoring Report, 2007). 
Another concept used in this study is ICT. One of the major questions in the literature, 
both on theoretical and empirical grounds, is whether ICT can help to improve gender 
equality within society. We can define ICT as technology and tools such as the 
telephone, radio, and internet that people share, distribute, use to gather information, 
and use to communicate with the others. The gender and technology relationship have 
been examined by numerous studies in the literature by using different perspectives, 
approaches, and theoretical viewpoints. Studies from a feminist point of view largely 
focus on women‘s exemption from using information technology due to reasons such 
as society and technology itself. We can classify studies examining the gender and 
technology relationship under two broad headings. Scholars sharing the first view 
assume that technology is gender neutral, and what really matters is how technology 
is used (Lohan and Faulkner, 2004). The women who have limited opportunities for 
participating in social and economic life due to constraints, such as time and 
socio-cultural norms, may become more active by using ICT applications and ICT 
tools. A second group of scholars assume that technology is gendered, because it is 
developed and shaped by society. However, in turn, technology itself affects society 
as well (Hodgkinson, 2000; Wajcman, 2009). Lohan and Faulkner (2004) classify the 
feminist studies on technology as ―women in technology‖ studies, and ―women and 
technology‖ studies (p. 320). While women in technology studies generally focused 
on the reasons for there being fewer women in technology-related occupations, 
women and technology studies developed two opposite approach to the outcomes of 
technology, which are optimistic and pessimistic approach. According to the results of 
a study conducted about the impact of ICT expansion in the Middle East region for 
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the period of 1995-2003 by Shirazi (2008), expansion of the ICT decreases the digital 
divide and promotes democracy and freedom in the region.  
 
On the other hand, generally, most countries and international organizations define 
rights by the laws. However, there is still a broken link in applying these laws because 
of beliefs, cultures, stereotypes, lack of accountability systems, etc. (Rao and 
Kelleher, 2003). World Bank defines the governance as ―the traditions and institutions 
by which authority in a country are exercised for the common good.‖ According to 
Cheema (2005), good governance and quality of institutions have a positive impact on 
the level of economic development, efficiency, sustainability, degree of access, and 
participation. Therefore, institutions shape rules and regulations, and economic 
activities of agents such as firms and families (Branisa et al., 2010). Then good 
governance provides efficient and effective allocation of resources and powers. 
Branisa et al. (2010) found that social institutions which take women away from 
decision making or the bargaining process are positively associated with low level 
education for girl, high rate of child mortality, and negatively associated with 
governance measured as rule of law, voice, and accountability (p. 18). 
 
Although our discussion centers on these aspects of MENA countries, we should keep 
in mind that the region is heterogeneous in terms of institutions, laws, and income, 
while they are similar in terms of language and culture. The majority of the people in 
the MENA region are Muslim or Arab.   
 
In the literature, religious practices and gender relations are examined by several 
studies and it is generally concluded that Islam as a reason of persistent gender 
inequality. For example, Fish (2002) analyzed the impact of Islam on literacy rate, sex 
ratio, women‘s political participation, and GEM by using cross-section data and 
concluded that that as overall, status of women in Muslim countries are inferior rather 
than in non-Muslim countries. However, Fish explained that the only reason of this 
result is due to the democratic deficit in these countries.  Additionally, Donna and 
Russett (2004) concluded that the effect if Islam is much stronger and consistent in 
Arab countries. Noland (2005) reached to the similar conclusion and explained the 
reason of autocratic nature of nations with higher Muslim population as a reflection of 
being Arab rather than Islamic. 
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According to the Inglehart and Norris (2003), the reason of cultural conflict between 
Islamic countries and the West is not their political system (democracy), but gender 
equality. They found that Muslim societies are significantly less supportive on equal 
opportunities and rights for women.  
 
Rauch and Kostyshak (2009) analyzed the gender gap in education and labor force 
participation in Muslim countries. They used the Muslim percentage of county‘s 
population as an explanatory variables and found that gender gap in 100% Muslim 
countries is 18.3% higher than a country with 0% Muslim population share. However, 
when they added a dummy variable for Arab countries, Muslim ratio was loosing its 
significance. They concluded that Arab effect explains Islamic effect (p. 182).  
According to their suggestion, if it is not Islamic effect, there are two reasons to 
explain the results; social pressure on married Arab women due to the common belief 
of supporting them by husbands, and very strong beliefs and expectations about 
mothers to continue their careers as mothers at home.  
 
Another important issue for the MENA is that, most countries in this region are oil-
exporting countries, and in the studies, oil sector is classified as male dominated 
sector, which discourage women to enter labor market (Moghadam, 2004; Ross, 
2008). This argument is used in the literature while explaining the reason of low-level 
labor force participation rate of female in MENA. Ross (2008) used cross national 
regressions on female labor force by using oil rents per capita as an explanatory 
variable with some other control variables such as income, income squared, working 
age, Islam as a share of Muslims, dummy for MENA, and dummy for Communist 
states.  The results showed that the Islam does not have effect on female labor force, 
while oil rents have significant negative impact on female labor force. However, 
World Bank compare Egypt and Indonesia in 2012 MENA report and conclude that 
even if these countries have similar oil reserves, diversification in exports, and 
potential for employing female, female labor force participating rate in Egypt is half 
of Indonesia. In this case, we have to use some other variables rather than religion or 
oil while explaining the gender inequality or gender gap in MENA region.  
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3. DATA AND EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY  
 
The focus of this study is to investigate impact of religion, institutional quality, and 
ICT on gender equality, especially for MENA region. Cross-sectional estimation is 
used for 209
3
 countries for the year 2008 to investigate the empirical questions.  
 
We use two empirical specifications to investigate the impact of religion, region, ICT 
and institutional quality on gender equality. Specifications do differ mainly in terms 
of their independent variables, although control variables also differ slightly across 
the specifications. Dummies are used for Islamic countries, MENA region, oil 
exporter countries, and Arabs to compare them with the others. All specifications use 
GII as a dependent variable as a measure of gender equality.  Lower values of GII 
represent higher gender equality for the countries. The first specification uses Muslim 
ratio as independent variable that proxies extent of Islamic impact in country‘s 
culture, laws, and standards. Muslim ratio is obtained by dividing the Muslim 
population in the country by the total population. We use ICT index, which is 
constructed by using six measures of ICT access and density in the specification. 
These are (1) number of computers per 100 persons, (2) the number of internet users 
per 100 persons, (3) the number of telephones per 100 persons, (4) ICT expenditure as 
a share of GDP, (5) ICT expenditure per capita, and (6) mobile subscribers per 
employee. In order to gain some insights about the relationship between ICT and 
gender inequality, Figure 1 plots GII against six measures of ICT access and use. 
Simple regressions fits are also represented in each plot. Figure 1 show that all 
measures of ICT are negatively related to GII, implying the improvement in ICT use 
and access reduces gender inequality.  
 
The institutional-social infrastructure quality is proxied by six variables obtained from 
PRS. These six indicators are (i) Corruption, (ii) Rule of Law, (iii) Bureaucratic 
Quality, (iv) Composite Risk Rating, (v) Government Stability, and (vi) Democratic 
Accountability. The graphical presentation of GII against the above six measures the 
institutional quality given in Figure 2 suggests that all measures are negatively related 
to GII, implying that improvements in institutional quality leads to reduction in 
                                                        
3
 Although there are 209 countries in our sample, number of observations in each regression varies 
because of missing values in the variables entering the regression equations.  
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gender inequality. Simple regression fits shown in Figure 2 also all have negative 
signs. Since all six measures are highly correlated we construct an index of 
institutional quality from the underlying six series using principal components 
analysis.  
 
Here, the main argument is that better institutional quality and higher-level access to 
ICTs provides better gender equality levels for the countries by providing better 
opportunities to the women. In both regression specifications, the PPP adjusted per 
capita income, total average years of schooling for age 15+ are used as additional 
control variables. Definition of all variables are given in Table 1 and descriptive 
statistics in Table 2. 
 
The GII is computed for the year 2008. Other variables are averages over 2000-2008. 
Taking averages over a longer span for the other variables increases the number of 
observations available in the regression, but more importantly incorporates the 
lagging impact of education, intuitional quality, and ICT
4
.   
 
The empirical estimations are carried out in a cross-country framework due the data 
limitations. We estimate several variant of the following basic cross-section 
regression specification:  
 
   (    )        (         )        (  )     (1) 
     
where i denotes the country.  
GII  = Gender Inequality Index 
MUSRATIO = Muslim population/total population 
X = vector of control variables 
ε   = error term.  
 
Control variables include the following: 
 
ICTI = ICT Index created by using factor analysis 
                                                        
4
 Results are qualitatively the same when only 2008 data is used, but several parameter estimated 
become insignificant and estimates lose their precision due to increased number of missing values.  
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INSTQ = Institutional Quality Index created by using factor analysis 
PPP2010  = PPP adjusted per capita income 
Following dummy variables are defined in order to examine the impact category they 
relate: 
 
ARAB = 1 for Arab countries, 0 for others 
ISLAMIC = dummy to measure to what extend country is Muslim, it is defined as 
1 if MUSRATIO>0.75, 0 otherwise 
MENA = 1, if the country is in the MENA region, 0 otherwise 
OIL = 1, if the country is a major oil exporter, 0 otherwise 
 
The second specification uses social regulation of religion index (range between 0-10, 
lower is less regulation) as the independent variable to check the robustness of the 
results. The second cross-section regression is specified as follows: 
   (    )        (     )        (  )       (2) 
where,  
MSRI = social regulation of religion index (range between 0-10, lower is     
                         less regulation) 
 
and other variables are as defined below Eq. (1).  
 
There are six measures of ICT, relating to access to or use of ICT. An option is to 
include each ICT measure in a separate regression. Unfortunately, this will exclude 
other dimensions. Alternatively, all six ICT measures can be included in the 
regression. A problem with this approach is the likely multicollinearity. Pearson 
correlation coefficients given in Table 3 show that some of the ICT variables are 
highly correlates, leading to suspect for multicollinearity.  In order to overcome these 
difficulties, we form an ICT index, denoted ICTI, based on principal components.  
Table 4 gives the details of the principal components analysis on six ICT variables. 
First principal component explains 72% of the total variation in these six ICT 
measures. Therefore, we create an index of ICT using the weights relating to first 
principal component (PC 1), which are given in the first column of panel 2 of Table 4. 
 
As for ICT variables, analogous concerns relates to six measures of institutional 
quality. In order avoid misspecification or multicollinearity, we prefer to create and 
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index of institutional quality, denoted INSTQ. Principal component analysis results 
are given in Table 5 for six dimensions of institutional quality considered in the study. 
There are two eigenvalues exceeding 1 and one can possibly include two principal 
components. Noting that the second components explains only 19% of the total 
variation in the six institutional quality variables, we decided to keep only the first 
principal component, which explains 58% of the total variation.  
 
We used four dummies to capture the regional and religion effects. In order examine 
the interaction of ARAB, ISLAMIC, MENA, and OIL categories with the measure of 
extend of religiosity. The interaction dummy indicates whether the category it 
represents has impact on gender inequality beyond and above the average impact of 
religiosity measures MUSRATIO or MSRI. If, for instance the coefficient of the 
interaction term MUSRATIO*ARAB is positive and significant, it means that 
negative impact of religiosity on gender equality is more than other countries.  
 
In studies involving impact of religiosity, often a dummy variable is added to 
discriminate between Muslim and non-Muslim countries or MENA countries and 
non-MENA countries to control for differences between the two categories, ceteris 
paribus. In this study, we particularly avoid such use of dummy variables to measure 
the impact of Islamic religiosity on gender equality. We rather use MUSRATIO and 
MSRI, which indicates degree of a country in terms of extend of Islamic regulation. 
Dummy variable are only used to control for only Muslim dominance (a country with 
more than 75% muslim population), Arab, and MENA effects, but not for measuring 
the impact of Islamic religiosity on gender equality. There is rising trend in the 
literature (see Jacobsen and Newman, 1995) to use of dummy variables to control for 
gender differences, while use of interactions with other variables, such as race, has 
decreased. There are two major problems with use of dummy variables in order 
discriminate Muslim and non-Muslim countries. First, a dummy variable that 
classifies a country as Muslim does not make any differentiation on religiosity, Saudi 
Arabia and Turkey, for instance, are classified as the same. Second, traditional way of 
using dummy variables in the gender equality regression is useful for quantifying 
discriminatory outcomes, but do not provide a comprehensive analysis on the 
discriminatory process and how causes of the discriminatory outcome.    
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4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
First, simple regressions estimation results are presented in Table 1. Simple 
regressions of GII on MUSRATIO and MSRI illustrate the likely misleading results 
that may arise from misspecified regressions. Simple regressions are also estimated 
on dummy variables in order serve as a benchmark to compare the results and show 
outcome of possible specification in Eq. (1) and Eq. (2). They also show the 
misleading results that arise from the use of dummy variables. According to the 
Breusch-Pagan and White test results, error terms are heteroskedastic and therefor we 
used generalized least squares using White method to get consistent estimates of the t 
statistics and corresponding p-values. The number of observations used in each 
regression varies due the data availability for related variables.  
 
Table 6 presents results for benchmark bivariate regression. In each case logarithm of 
GII is regressed on one on the MSRI and MUSRATIO, as well on dummy variables 
MENA, ARAB, ISLAMIC and OIL. These regressions are most likely to be 
misspecified and are presented here in order show possible misleading inferences may 
arise. Three dummy variables, MENA, ARAB, and ISLAMIC all have positive and 
significant coefficients at 1 percent level. The size of the coefficients are, 0.32, 0.23, 
and 0.22 for ISLAMIC, MENA, and ARAB. These estimates imply that, gender 
equality is on average worse in countries with Muslim population ratio grater than 
75%, in the MENA countries, and ARAB countries. Indeed, on the GII scale 
ISLAMIC, MENA, and ARAB countries are 1.38, 1.26, and 1.25 points above the 
average of the other countries. Considering that the average of GII is 0.54, these are 
highly significant numbers, being about 2.5 times worse. Interestingly, MENA region 
and Arab countries are indeed better than the whole of the countries with Muslim 
population ratio of 75% or higher. The OIL dummy is interestingly negative, although 
it is not significant. There seems to be no significant impact of oil on the gender 
equality.  
 
From the plots in Figure 3, we see that both MUSRATIO and MSRI are positively 
related to GII, implying that there is direct and inverse relation between gender 
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equality and the Muslim majority as well as Islamic regulation (regulation of social 
life with Islamic values of norms)   
 
Table 6 also presents regressions of log GII against MUSRATIO and MSRI, included 
in each regression one of the ARAB, MENA, or ISLAMIC dummy variables. 
MUSRATIO has a positive and significant coefficient when MENA and OIL 
dummies are in the regression. The coefficient of MUSRATIO is negative but 
insignificant when ISLAMIC dummy is in the regression and positive but 
insignificant when ARAB dummy is in the regression. In each case, ARAB, MENA, 
and ISLAMIC dummy variables have positive and significant coefficients. These 
results imply that Muslim population ratio has a negative impact on gender equality, 
and Arab, MENA, and Muslim majority countries are worse than the average. 
 
How representative the Muslim population ratio as a proxy for extends of Islamic 
regulation of the social life could be disputable. The MSRI ranking is probably a 
better proxy for the Islamic religiosity of the social life. The regression results given 
in Table 6 indicate that MSRI has indeed significant and negative relationship with 
GII, when any of the ARAB, MENA, and ISLAMIC dummy variables is in the 
regression. In the case of OIL dummy the coefficient of MSRI is still negative but 
insignificant. Here the finding is that extend of regulation of social life by religious 
norm and values do not increase gender inequality, it rather reduces it. In terms of the 
ARAB, MENA, and ISLAMIC dummy variables is in the regressions with MRSI, we 
again find that these have positive and significant estimates. The OIL dummy is again 
negative but insignificant. The findings here shed serious doubts on the use of Muslim 
population ratio as a proxy for extend of Islamic regulation of social life.  
 
As we discussed previously, the regression results in Table 6 are misleading when 
there are other significant variables affecting the gender inequality. We consider three 
variables here: per capita GDP, access to and use of ICT, education, and institutional 
quality. These regressions additionally include ARAB, MENA, and ISLAMIC 
dummy variables and their interaction with religion variable (MUSRATIO or MSRI). 
The dummy variables are included whether the Arab, MENA, and Muslim majority 
countries are on average different than other countries. The interaction terms captures 
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whether regulation of social life by Islamic norms and values do have different effect 
on gender inequality in the Arab, MENA, and Muslim majority countries.  
 
Regression estimation results for when the MUSRATIO variable is used as a proxy 
are given in Table 7. These estimates have one result that cannot go unnoticed: The 
MUSRATIO variable is insignificant in all regression, except the case where only 
OIL dummy is used and other control variables are excluded. Since the regressions 
with excluded control variables are possibly misspecified, this exceptional regression 
can be ignored. The message is clear and great consideration. There is no relation 
between gender inequality and Muslim population ratio. Muslim population ratio is 
the variable most commonly used in the previous studies that found an adverse effect 
from this variable on gender equality. Our results are certainly challenging to those. 
What then accounts for gender inequality differences, if it is not religion? The results 
in Table 7 finds strong an consistent negative significant relationship between gender 
inequality and three control variables, which are INSTQ, ICTI, and BLYEAR15. 
Institutional quality, ICT and education accounts for most of the gender differences 
across the countries and Muslim population ratio has no impact. Interestingly, we find 
that per capita income is not related or even inversely related to gender inequality, 
implying that an increase in income does not help eliminate the gender gap.  
 
In terms of the interaction terms Table 7 shows that the interaction of MUSRATIO 
with ARAB, MENA, and ISLAMIC dummy variables is negative and significant 
when other control variables are in the regression. The OIL interaction term is found 
to be insignificant. Therefore, in terms of the impact of Muslim population ratio on 
gender inequality Arab, Mena, and Muslim majority countries do indeed better than 
the other countries. However, ARAB, MENA, and ISLAMIC dummy variables, 
which capture the average of the category they represent relative to all other 
observations, keep their significance and adverse impact on GII. This however does 
not change the fact that higher Muslim majority does not make the gender inequality 
worse; it even does improve it, particularly in the MENA region.  
 
We have shown above that MUSRATIO is probably not a proper measure of the 
extend of the regulation of social life Islamic norms and values. MSRI is based on a 
ranking and better represents the extend of religious regulation of social life. The 
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regression results relating to MSRI are given in Table 8. The results in Table 8 do 
enhance the results in Table 6 and indeed are more noteworthy. The most important 
finding is again the coefficient of MSRI is all uniformly negative, and sometimes 
even significant. This is again a clear and strong rejection of the belief that extend of 
Islamic norms and values in social life has an adverse impact on gender equality. Our 
findings show that higher regulation of social life by Islamic norms and values does 
not have any adverse impact on GII. Gender differences are more accounted by 
variables such institutions, ICT, and education. Again, per capita income does not 
improve gender equality. The last and probably the most important finding relates to 
the central focus of our study. In Table 8, when control variables are introduced all of 
the ARAB, MENA, and ISLAMIC dummy variables became insignificant. 
Furthermore, the interaction of these variables with the Islamic regulation variable 
MSRI are all insignificant. The data does not support a myth that the gender gap in 
Muslim majority countries is a mere result of religion, which is often echoed.     
  
4. CONLUSION 
 
Gender inequality—the disparities between males and females in opportunity and 
security—has serious cost implications and these are negatively effecting the human 
and economic development. Gender equality has become a more visible issue for the 
Arab, and more generally MENA countries following the Arab Spring. Gender 
inequality, or gender issues more broadly, for the Muslim countries are more 
pronounced than other countries and regions, usually from social, anthropological, or 
political angles. Oil and religion are singled out as factors placing women and girls of 
the Muslim countries in a more disadvantageous position than women and girls in 
other developing countries.  This study examined the relationship between gender 
inequality in the MENA countries and more broadly in Muslim countries, by taking 
into account of the impact economic development, ICT, education, and institutions in 
the MENA region and tested whether the impacts differ for the MENA countries. The 
major focus of the study is to test the impact of regulation of social life by the Islamic 
norms and values on the gender inequality.  Most studies have used gender inequality 
in employment and education as basic indicators of gender inequality and usually 
their impacts on economic growth is studied. This study considers broader measures 
of gender inequality and its determinants. For instance, improvements in ICT, 
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education, and institutional quality have direct impacts on the welfare of women and 
directly impact the gender gap. Therefore, impacts of improvements in the 
determinants of gender inequality should be considered more broadly rather than 
simply examining the impact of classification by religion or by some other social 
norms. Thus, this study utilizes broader concepts of gender equality and its 
determinants. Rather than traditional measures such as the labor force participation 
rate of females relative to males, the study uses gender inequality index, which are 
based on variables that measure several dimensions of gender inequality. The study 
uses a cross-sectional dataset for 209 countries. Empirical evidence obtained in the 
study shows that the religion has only significant effect on gender inequality when 
other determinants, such as the economic development, education, ICT, and 
institutional quality are excluded from the model. Additionally, the classification 
dummies for Arab, MENA, and Muslim majority countries, as well as their 
interaction with the religion variable, are not significant. However, ICT, education, 
and institutional quality have a significantly positive impact on gender equality, 
implying improvements in these variables reduces gender inequality. No other 
significant difference has been found relating to religion and oil across the MENA, 
Arab, and Muslim majority countries. The apparently significant religious and oil 
impacts disappeared once institutional variables are incorporated into the regressions. 
The paper obtains empirical evidence against the belief that the religion and oil are 
culprits responsible for holding women back in the Muslim countries. Neither of these 
factors fully explains the facts.    
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Figure 1. Gender Equality and ICT 
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Figure 2. Gender Equality and Institutional Quality 
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Figure 3. Gender Equality and Other Variables 
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Table 1. Variable Definitions 
Variable Description 
GII Gender Inequality Index, (0=no inequality, 1=equality)  
MUSRATIO Muslim rates, female (% of total population, defined as Muslims/population) 
MSRI0308 
Modified Social Regulation of Religion Index, averages from 2003, 2005 and 2008 
International Religious Freedom Reports (0-10, lower is less regulation) 
PPP2010 Gross national income per capita (PPP 2008 US $) 
IU Internet users (per 100 people) 
MCS Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people) 
PC Personal Computers (per 100 inhabitants)
*
 
TL Telephone lines (per 100 people) 
UR Urban population (% of total) 
BLST Barro-Lee: Average years of total schooling, age 15+, total 
ICTEPC Information and communication technology expenditure per capita (current US$) 
ICTEPGDP Information and communication technology expenditure (% of GDP) 
BQ Bureaucracy Quality (L) 
RR Composite Risk Rating 
CO Corruption (F) 
DA Democratic Accountability (K) 
GS Government Stability (A) 
LO Law & Order (I) 
ICTI ICT index, constructed from ICT variables by using principle component analysis 
INSTQ Institutional quality index, constructed form institutional variables 
MENA Dummy for MENA region (1=MENA, 0=others ) 
ISLAMIC Dummy for ISLAMIC countries, defined as musratio>0.75 (1=ISLAMIC, 0=others) 
ARAB Dummy for ARAB countries (1=ARAB, 0=others) 
OIL Dummy for oil exporting countries (1=oil exporters, 0=others) 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
       
       
 GII2008 MUSRATIO ICTI INSTQ PPP2010 BLYEAR15 
       
       
 Mean  0.541691  0.222167  445.0510  71.03810  13520.63  8.110979 
 Median  0.575000  0.024342  172.8742  70.34421  7998.000  8.507800 
 Maximum  0.853000  1.497795  1841.810  94.20640  81011.00  12.70540 
 Minimum  0.174000  0.000000  8.788922  37.39489  176.0000  1.756600 
 Std. Dev.  0.178498  0.352492  476.3772  11.54864  15222.12  2.580580 
 Skewness -0.326616  1.478222  0.951921 -0.234275  1.806750 -0.455654 
 Kurtosis  1.837390  3.749630  2.674077  2.861430  6.597644  2.366115 
       
 Jarque-Bera  10.29975  79.84653  11.34796  1.362809  198.2532  7.393750 
 Probability  0.005800  0.000000  0.003434  0.505906  0.000000  0.024801 
       
 Sum  75.29500  45.76643  32488.72  9732.220  2474275.  1167.981 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  4.396886  25.47139  16339338  18138.47  4.22E+10  952.2931 
       
 Observations  139  206  173  137  183  144 
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Table 3. Pearson Correlation Coefficients between Measures of ICT 
 LPC  LIU  LTL  LMCS  ICTEPC  ICTEPGDP  
LPC  1.00      
 -----       
       
LIU  0.71 1.00     
 (40.8) -----      
       
LTL  0.76 0.48 1.00    
 (48.0) (22.4) -----     
       
LMCS  0.67 0.87 0.45 1.00   
 (36.6) (70.7) (20.9) -----    
       
ICTEPC 0.35 0.16 0.24 0.11 1.00  
 (15.2) (6.50) (10.3) (4.35) -----   
       
ICTEPGDP -0.23 -0.37 -0.08 -0.38 0.02 1.00 
 (-9.87) (-16.2) (-3.29) (-16.7) (0.83) -----  
Notes: t-statistic for the significance of the Pearson correlation coefficients are given in 
parentheses. 
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Table 4. Principal Components Analysis for ICT Variables 
       
       
Eigenvalues: (Sum = 6, Average = 1)    
    Cumulative Cumulative  
Number Value    Difference Proportion Value Proportion  
       
       
1 4.327790 3.411771 0.7213 4.327790 0.7213  
2 0.916019 0.514848 0.1527 5.243809 0.8740  
3 0.401172 0.212875 0.0669 5.644981 0.9408  
4 0.188297 0.076862 0.0314 5.833278 0.9722  
5 0.111435 0.056148 0.0186 5.944713 0.9908  
6 0.055287 ---     0.0092 6.000000 1.0000  
       
       
Eigenvectors (loadings):      
       
Variable PC 1   PC 2   PC 3   PC 4   PC 5   PC 6   
       
       
IU 0.457105 -0.072455 0.037535 -0.350778 -0.738488 -0.340568 
MCS 0.393626 0.108080 -0.882818 -0.094406 0.184597 0.104984 
PC 0.451561 -0.151255 0.332668 -0.331151 0.131003 0.731932 
TL 0.438775 -0.152986 0.061346 0.863761 -0.161871 0.089571 
ICTEPC 0.456564 -0.096779 0.261934 -0.093239 0.613846 -0.572777 
ICTEPGDP 0.176724 0.963026 0.190220 0.060040 -0.019729 0.034221 
       
       
Ordinary correlations:     
        
 IU MCS PC TL ICTEPC ICTEPGDP 
IU 1.000000      
MCS 0.747295 1.000000     
PC 0.905661 0.649285 1.000000    
TL 0.833670 0.692431 0.834266 1.000000   
ICTEPC 0.879996 0.686383 0.932208 0.857917 1.000000  
ICTEPGDP 0.285567 0.327755 0.234674 0.215600 0.280318 1.000000 
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Table 5. Principal Components Analysis for Institutional Variables 
       
       
Eigenvalues: (Sum = 6, Average = 1)    
    Cumulative Cumulative  
Number Value    Difference Proportion Value Proportion  
       
       
1 3.490817 2.343106 0.5818 3.490817 0.5818  
2 1.147711 0.573784 0.1913 4.638528 0.7731  
3 0.573927 0.236902 0.0957 5.212454 0.8687  
4 0.337025 0.045238 0.0562 5.549479 0.9249  
5 0.291787 0.133053 0.0486 5.841266 0.9735  
6 0.158734 ---     0.0265 6.000000 1.0000  
       
       
Eigenvectors (loadings):      
       
Variable PC 1   PC 2   PC 3   PC 4   PC 5   PC 6   
       
       
BQ 0.471875 -0.145008 0.015312 -0.348141 -0.653495 0.455866 
CO 0.420636 -0.302056 -0.379821 0.747692 -0.119624 -0.119209 
DA 0.375058 -0.323539 0.774252 0.124676 0.361191 0.095838 
GS 0.170397 0.840784 0.212435 0.380496 -0.079610 0.260390 
LO 0.448811 0.123418 -0.454916 -0.284811 0.640767 0.291012 
RR 0.478815 0.246794 0.062915 -0.279849 -0.106094 -0.785047 
       
       
Ordinary correlations:     
        
 BQ CO DA GS LO RR 
BQ 1.000000      
CO 0.666272 1.000000     
DA 0.601891 0.511101 1.000000    
GS 0.131999 0.006152 0.016843 1.000000   
LO 0.647051 0.615757 0.399624 0.291216 1.000000  
RR 0.744457 0.551842 0.528325 0.464761 0.739462 1.000000 
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Table 6. Simple Regression Estimation Results 
Dep. Var: LOG(GII2008) 
 Model 1.1 Model 1.2 Model 1.3 Model 1.4 Model 1.5 Model 1.6 Model 1.7 Model 1.8 Model 1.9 Model 1.10 Model 1.11 Model 1.12 
             
             
ISLAMIC  0.3171     0.3253     0.3860    
 (0.0508)
***
    (0.0833)
***
    (0.0588)
***
    
             
C -0.7369 -0.6977 -0.7037 -0.6581 -0.7452 -0.6189 -0.6288 -0.5387 -0.6292 -0.6204 -0.6242 -0.6256 
 (0.0383)
***
 (0.0362)
***
 (0.0369)
***
 (0.0346)
***
 (0.0769)
***
 (0.0584)
***
 (0.0594)
***
 (0.0465)
***
 (0.0496)
***
 (0.0509)
***
 (0.0516)
***
 (0.0509)
***
 
             
MENA   0.2117     0.1333     0.2671   
  (0.0635)
***
    (0.0782)
*
    (0.0747)
***
   
             
ARAB    0.2331     0.1589     0.2884  
   (0.0626)
***
    (0.0778)
**
    (0.0732)
***
  
             
OIL    -0.1491    -0.2087    -0.1338 
    (0.1138)    (0.1050)
**
    (0.1191) 
             
LOG(MUSRATIO)     -0.0009  0.0212  0.0195  0.0327     
     (0.0140) (0.0119)
*
 (0.0120) (0.0105)
***
     
             
LOG(MSRI0308)         -0.0966 -0.0664 -0.0682 -0.0274 
         (0.0353)
***
 (0.0363)
*
 (0.0365)
*
 (0.0352) 
             
             
R-squared: 0.1054 0.0281 0.0362 0.0157 0.1076 0.0478 0.0522 0.0695 0.1464 0.0479 0.0571 0.0192 
Log Likelihood: -55.2150 -60.8099 -60.1583 -61.6679 -55.5589 -60.0039 -59.6894 -58.4250 -52.0455 -59.4199 -58.7052 -61.4250 
S.E.R: 0.3670 0.3825 0.3833 0.3849 0.3670 0.3791 0.3783 0.3748 0.3598 0.3800 0.3805 0.3857 
SBC: 0.8907 0.9736 0.9782 0.9863 0.9188 0.9837 0.9791 0.9607 0.8801 0.9893 0.9931 1.0190 
F-statistic: 15.6698 3.8439 4.9235 2.1153 8.0821 3.3647 3.6885 5.0054 11.3228 3.3203 3.9329 1.2914 
Prob(F-stat): 0.0001 0.0520 0.0282 0.1482 0.0005 0.0375 0.0276 0.0080 0.0000 0.0392 0.0220 0.2783 
WhiteTest: 15.7810
***
 6.3663
**
 7.1160
***
 0.9436 10.1405
***
 3.0527
*
 3.3589
**
 0.4589 7.6924
***
 3.1429
**
 3.4385
**
 0.6406 
BPG Test: 15.7810
***
 6.3663
**
 7.1160
***
 0.9436 9.4689
***
 2.8839
*
 3.1212
**
 1.6938 8.6280
***
 4.0090
**
 4.3051
**
 0.9486 
Jarque Bera Test: 10.2702
***
 13.4014
***
 12.7350
***
 15.3255
***
 9.7578
***
 13.1215
***
 12.8869
***
 13.4300
***
 8.9542
**
 12.5167
***
 11.9543
***
 15.0180
***
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Table 7. Regression Results for GII and Using The Muslim Population Ratio 
Dep. Var: LOG(GII2008) 
 Model 2.1 Model 2.2 Model 2.3 Model 2.4 Model 2.5 Model 2.6 Model 2.7 Model 2.8 Model 2.9 Model 2.10 
           
           LOG(MUSRATIO)  0.0275  0.0008 -0.0010 -0.0100  0.0210 -0.0153  0.0193 -0.0127  0.0296 -0.0042 
 (0.0102)
***
 (0.0094) (0.0141) (0.0109) (0.0119)
*
 (0.0088)
*
 (0.0120) (0.0086) (0.0108)
***
 (0.0091) 
           
C -0.5829  3.5462 -0.7456  3.2980 -0.6196  3.7305 -0.6293  3.6720 -0.5504  3.4056 
 (0.0445)
***
 (1.1711)
***
 (0.0772)
***
 (1.2198)
***
 (0.0587)
***
 (1.5287)
**
 (0.0597)
***
 (1.4261)
**
 (0.0476)
***
 (1.3773)
**
 
           
LOG(PPP2010)   0.1394   0.1165   0.0768   0.0969   0.0964 
  (0.0576)
**
  (0.0578)
**
  (0.0668)  (0.0632)  (0.0733) 
           LOG(INSTQ)  -0.8917  -0.8609  -0.8803  -0.8989  -0.7966 
  (0.3181)
***
  (0.3172)
***
  (0.3642)
**
  (0.3494)
**
  (0.3407)
**
 
           
LOG(ICTI)  -0.2376  -0.2221  -0.1959  -0.2130  -0.2246 
  (0.0431)
***
  (0.0437)
***
  (0.0572)
***
  (0.0538)
***
  (0.0548)
***
 
           LOG(BLYEAR15)  -0.2619  -0.1791  -0.2429  -0.2184  -0.2484 
  (0.1206)
**
  (0.1216)  (0.1068)
**
  (0.1122)
*
  (0.1265)
*
 
           
ISLAMIC    0.3340  0.1928       
   (0.0841)
***
 (0.1064)
*
       
           
LOG(MUSRATIO)*ISLAMIC    0.1567  0.6503       
   (0.1726) (0.3974)       
           
MENA      0.1443  0.2339     
     (0.0761)
*
 (0.0931)
**
     
           LOG(MUSRATIO) *MENA      0.5137 -0.6371     
     (0.2568)
**
 (0.3396)
*
     
           
ARAB        0.1703  0.2319   
       (0.0761)
**
 (0.1046)
**
   
           
LOG(MUSRATIO) *ARAB        0.2933 -0.5819   
       (0.2552) (0.3932)   
           
OIL         -0.1288  0.1314 
         (0.1144) (0.1341) 
           
LOG(MUSRATIO)
*
OIL          0.0368  0.0128 
         (0.0485) (0.0325) 
           
           R-squared: 0.0388 0.7802 0.1081 0.7916 0.0516 0.8172 0.0539 0.8154 0.0746 0.7872 
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Log Likelihood: -60.6474 16.0215 -55.5224 17.8835 -59.7277 22.4766 -59.5650 22.1385 -58.0461 17.1598 
S.E.R: 0.3795 0.2013 0.3683 0.1991 0.3798 0.1865 0.3793 0.1874 0.3752 0.2012 
SBC: 0.9572 -0.0936 0.9542 -0.0254 1.0156 -0.1566 1.0132 -0.1470 0.9910 -0.0047 
F-statistic: 5.4540 45.4356 5.3744 33.6417 2.4145 39.6014 2.5257 39.1355 3.5763 32.7720 
Prob(F-stat): 0.0210 0.0000 0.0016 0.0000 0.0694 0.0000 0.0603 0.0000 0.0158 0.0000 
WhiteTest: 0.0948 0.8154 6.7701
***
 0.7016 2.2216
*
 0.9356 2.3160
*
 0.9094 0.8426 1.7159 
BPG Test: 1.6357 1.1369 6.3125
***
 0.8192 2.0989 1.1289 2.1674
*
 1.0307 1.7457 1.9395
*
 
Jarque Bera Test: 14.2839
***
 2.8510 9.7354
***
 2.2976 13.0906
***
 1.9325 12.8290
***
 1.8482 13.0125
***
 1.1590 
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Table 8. Regression Results for GII and Using The Modified Social Regulation of Religion Index 
Dep. Var: LOG(GII2008) 
 Model 3.1 Model 3.2 Model 3.3 Model 3.4 Model 3.5 Model 3.6 Model 3.7 Model 3.8 Model 3.9 Model 3.10 
           
           LOG(MSRI0308) -0.0380 -0.0440 -0.1037 -0.0682 -0.0709 -0.0732 -0.0723 -0.0714 -0.0463 -0.0595 
 (0.0338) (0.0360) (0.0397)
**
 (0.0420) (0.0368)
*
 (0.0355)
**
 (0.0370)
*
 (0.0350)
**
 (0.0354) (0.0369) 
           
C -0.6282  3.3728 -0.6212  3.2418 -0.6151  3.9018 -0.6193  3.8852 -0.6032  3.3217 
 (0.0510)
***
 (1.1478)
***
 (0.0530)
***
 (1.2429)
**
 (0.0512)
***
 (1.4763)
**
 (0.0520)
***
 (1.3779)
***
 (0.0506)
***
 (1.3196)
**
 
           
LOG(PPP2010)   0.1569   0.1298   0.1159   0.1357   0.1120 
  (0.0624)
**
  (0.0623)
**
  (0.0633)
*
  (0.0624)
**
  (0.0741) 
           
LOG(INSTQ)  -0.8368  -0.8203  -0.9653  -0.9946  -0.7654 
  (0.3250)
**
  (0.3206)
**
  (0.3591)
***
  (0.3487)
***
  (0.3522)
**
 
           
LOG(ICTI)  -0.2602  -0.2438  -0.2306  -0.2451  -0.2359 
  (0.0398)
***
  (0.0447)
***
  (0.0533)
***
  (0.0496)
***
  (0.0500)
***
 
           
LOG(BLYEAR15)  -0.2844  -0.1743  -0.1619  -0.1480  -0.2625 
  (0.1092)
**
  (0.1452)  (0.0925)
*
  (0.0954)  (0.1139)
**
 
           
ISLAMIC    0.2758  0.0341       
   (0.0795)
***
 (0.1313)       
           
LOG(MSRI0308)*ISLAMIC    0.0631  0.0514       
   (0.0511) (0.0672)       
           
MENA     -0.6856  0.3076     
     (0.3974)
*
 (0.6147)     
           
LOG(MSRI0308)*MENA      0.4780 -0.0220     
     (0.1941)
**
 (0.3233)     
           
ARAB       -0.5633  0.1494   
       (0.3859) (0.7632)   
           
LOG(MSRI0308)*ARAB        0.4322  0.0605   
       (0.1903)
**
 (0.4036)   
           
OIL         -1.3057 -0.3172 
         (0.3506)
***
 (0.2377) 
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LOG(MSRI0308)*OIL          0.6781  0.2267 
         (0.1757)
***
 (0.1525) 
           
           
R-squared: 0.0071 0.7927 0.1482 0.8033 0.0575 0.8290 0.0650 0.8300 0.0780 0.8058 
Log Likelihood: -62.2497 17.0189 -51.9059 18.8142 -58.7336 23.5649 -58.1420 22.9751 -57.2484 19.2495 
S.E.R: 0.3866 0.1973 0.3608 0.1953 0.3795 0.1822 0.3804 0.1830 0.3754 0.1941 
SBC: 0.9949 -0.1282 0.9143 -0.0569 1.0155 -0.1967 1.0214 -0.1838 0.9935 -0.0697 
F-statistic: 0.9558 47.4043 7.5972 35.0094 2.6655 41.5447 2.9896 41.1533 3.6962 35.5709 
Prob(F-stat): 0.3300 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0505 0.0000 0.0335 0.0000 0.0136 0.0000 
WhiteTest: 0.0057 0.6769 5.2289
***
 0.9079 2.6230
*
 1.3016 2.7346
**
 1.4421 0.5840 2.0588
*
 
BPG Test: 0.7412 0.5841 5.8609
***
 0.8318 3.2133
**
 1.4732 3.3281
**
 1.4850 0.8145 2.3197
**
 
Jarque Bera Test: 15.2656
***
 4.8317
*
 8.7764
**
 2.2904 12.3598
***
 1.7196 11.7739
***
 1.4008 13.8659
***
 0.7648 
           
           
 
 
 
